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Abstract—This paper presents a comprehensive analytical
study of two competitive cognitive operators’ spectrum leasing
and pricing strategies, taking into account operators’ hetero-
geneity in leasing costs and users’ heterogeneity in transmis-
sion power and channel conditions. We model the interactions
between operators and users as a three-stage dynamic game,
where operators make simultaneous spectrum leasing and pricing
decisions in Stages I and II, and users make purchase decisions in
Stage III. Using backward induction, we are able to completely
characterize the game’s equilibria. We show that both opera-
tors make the equilibrium leasing and pricing decisions based
on simple threshold policies. Moreover, two operators always
choose the same equilibrium price despite their difference in
leasing costs. Each user receives the same signal-to-noise-ratio
(SNR) at the equilibrium, and the obtained payoff is linear
in its transmission power and channel gain. We also compare
the duopoly equilibrium with the coordinated case where two
operators cooperate to maximize their total profit. We show that
the maximum loss of total profit due to operators’ competition
is no larger than 25%. The users, however, always benefit from
operators’ competition in terms of their payoffs. We show that
most of these insights are robust in the general SNR regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless spectrum is often considered as a scarce resource,
and thus has been tightly controlled by the governments
through static license-based allocations. However, several re-
cent field measurements show that many spectrum bands are
often under-utilized even in densely populated urban areas
[2]. To achieve more efficient spectrum utilization, various
dynamic spectrum access mechanisms have been proposed so
that unlicensed secondary users can share the spectrum with
the licensed primary users. One of the proposed mechanisms is
dynamic spectrum leasing, where a spectrum owner dynami-
cally transfers and trades the usage right of temporarily unused
part of its licensed spectrum to secondary network operators
or users in exchange of monetary compensation (e.g., [3]–
[7]). In this paper, we study the competition of two secondary
operators under the dynamic spectrum leasing mechanism.
Our study is motivated by the successful operations of
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in many countries
today1. An MVNO does not own wireless spectrum or even
the physical infrastructure. It provides services to end-users
by long-term spectrum leasing agreements with a spectrum
owner. MVNOs are similar to the “switchless resellers” of
the traditional landline telephone market. Switchless resellers
buy minutes wholesale from the large long distance companies
Part of the results will appear in the IEEE Symposium on International
Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), Singapore, April 2010 [1].
1There are over 400 mobile virtual network operators owned by over 360
companies worldwide as of February 2009 [8].
and resell them to their customers. As intermediaries between
spectrum owners and users, MVNOs can raise the competition
level of the wireless markets by providing competitive pricing
plans as well as more flexible and innovative value-added
services. However, an MVNO is often stuck in a long-term
contract with a spectrum owner and can not make flexible
spectrum leasing and pricing decisions to match the dynamic
demands of the users. The secondary operators considered in
this paper do not own wireless spectrum either. Compared with
a traditional MVNO, the secondary operators can dynamically
adjust their spectrum leasing and pricing decisions to match
the users’ demands that change with users’ channel conditions.
This paper studies the competition of two secondary oper-
ators (also called duopoly) who compete to serve a common
pool of secondary users. The secondary operators will dynam-
ically lease spectrum from spectrum owners, and then compete
to sell the resource to the secondary users to maximize their
individual profits. We would like to understand how the oper-
ators make the equilibrium investment (leasing) and pricing
(selling) decisions, considering operators’ heterogeneity in
leasing costs and wireless users’ heterogeneity in transmission
power and channel conditions.
We adopt a three-stage dynamic game model to study the
(secondary) operators’ investment and pricing decisions as
well as the interactions between the operators and the (sec-
ondary) users. From here on, we will simply use “operator” to
denote “secondary operator” and “users” to denote “secondary
users”. In Stage I, the two operators simultaneously lease
spectrum (bandwidth) from the spectrum owners with different
leasing costs. In Stage II, the two operators simultaneously
announce their spectrum retail prices to the users. In Stage
III, each user determines how much resource to purchase from
which operator. Each operator wants to maximizes its profit,
which is the difference between the revenue collected from
the users and the cost paid to the spectrum owner.
Key results and contributions of this paper include:
• A concrete wireless spectrum sharing model: We as-
sume that users share the spectrum using orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) technology. A
user’s achievable rate depends on its allocated bandwidth,
maximum transmission power, and channel condition.
This model is more concrete than several generic eco-
nomic models used in related literature (e.g., [6], [9]–
[11]), and can provide more insights on how the wireless
technology impact the operators’ equilibrium economic
decisions.
• Symmetric pricing equilibrium: We show the two oper-
ators’ always choose the same equilibrium price, even
2when they have different leasing costs and make different
equilibrium investment decisions. Moreover, this price is
independent of users’ transmission power and channel
conditions.
• Threshold structures of investment and pricing equilib-
rium: We show that the operators’ equilibrium investment
and pricing decisions follow simple threshold structures,
which are easy to implement in practice.
• Fair Quality of Service (QoS) of users: We show that
each user achieves the same signal-to-noise (SNR) that
is independent of the users’ population and wireless
characteristics.
• Impact of competition: We show that the operators’
competition leads to a maximum loss of 25% in terms
of the two operators’ total profit compared with a coor-
dinated case. The users, however, always benefit from the
operators’ competition by achieving better payoffs.
Next we briefly discuss the related literature. In Section
II, we describe the network model and game formulation. In
Section III, we analyze the dynamic game through backward
induction and calculate the duopoly leasing/pricing equilib-
rium. We discuss various insights obtained from the equilib-
rium analysis in Section IV. In Section VI, we show the impact
of duopoly competition on the total operators’ profit and the
users’ payoffs. We conclude in Section VII together with some
future research directions.
A. Related Work
The existing results on dynamic spectrum access mainly
focused on the technical aspects of primary users’ spectrum
sharing with secondary users. Two approaches are extensively
studied: (1) spectrum underlay, which allows secondary users
to coexist with primary users by imposing constraints on the
transmission powers of secondary users (e.g., [12]–[15]); (2)
spectrum overlay, which allows secondary users to identify
and exploit spatial and temporal spectrum availability in a
nonintrusive manner (e.g., [16]–[20]). These results did not
consider the spectrum owners’ economic incentive in sharing
spectrum with secondary users.
Recently researchers started to study the economic aspect
of dynamic spectrum access, such as the cognitive secondary
operators’ strategies of spectrum acquisition from spectrum
owners and service provision to the users. For example, several
auction mechanisms have been proposed for the spectrum
owner to allocate spectrum (e.g., [9], [21]–[26]). Cognitive
radio operators can also obtain spectrum by dynamically
leasing from the spectrum owner (e.g., [3], [5]–[7], [27]).
For operators’ service provision, most related results looked
at the pricing interactions between cognitive network opera-
tors and the secondary users (e.g., [6], [9]–[11], [28], [29]).
Ref. [6] and [9] studied the pricing competition among two or
more operators. Ref. [10] explored users’ demand functions
in both quality-sensitive and price-sensitive buyer population
models. Ref. [11] derived users’ demand functions based
on the acceptance probability model. Ref. [28] considered
users’ queuing delay due to congestion in spectrum sharing.
Ref. [29] modeled the dynamic behavior of secondary users
Secondary users (transm itter-receiver pairs) 
Spectrum 
owner  
Operator i Operator j
Investment 
(leasing bandwidth)
Pricing 
(selling bandwidth)
Spectrum 
owner
Fig. 1. Network model for the cognitive network operators.
as an evolutionary game, and proposed an iterative algorithm
for operators’ strategy adaption. Among these works, only
[28], [29] studied practical wireless spectrum sharing models
by modeling users’ wireless details. Many results have been
obtained mainly through extensive simulations (e.g., [9]–[11],
[28], [29]).
This work are related to our previous study [27], where
we considered the optimal sensing and leasing decisions of
a single secondary operator facing supply uncertainty. The
focus of this paper is to study the competition between two
operators.
Another closely related paper is [6], which also jointly
considered the the spectrum acquisition and service provision
for cognitive operators. The key difference here is that we
present a comprehensive analytical study that characterizes the
duopoly equilibrium investment and pricing decisions, with
heterogeneous leasing costs for the operators and a concrete
wireless spectrum sharing model for the users.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider two operators (i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j) and a
set K = {1, . . . ,K} of users as shown in Fig. 1. The operators
obtain wireless spectrum from different spectrum owners with
different leasing costs, and compete to serve the same set K
of users. Each user has a transmitter-receiver pair. We assume
that users are equipped with software defined radios and can
transmit in a wide range of frequencies as instructed by the
operators, but do not have the cognitive learning capacity.
Such a network structure puts most of the implementation
complexity for dynamic spectrum leasing and allocation on
the operators, and thus is easier to implement than a “full”
cognitive radio network especially for a large number of users.
A user may switch among different operators’ services (e.g.
WiMAX, 3G) depending on operators’ prices. It is important
to study the competition among multiple operators as operators
are normally not cooperative.
The interactions between the two operators and the users can
be modeled as a three-stage dynamic game, as shown in Fig. 2.
Operators i and j first simultaneously determine their leasing
bandwidths in Stage I, and then simultaneously announce the
3 Stage I: Operators determine leasing amounts ܤ݅  and ݆ܤ  (Subsection III-C)
Stage II: Operators announce prices ݌݅  and ݌݆ to the market (Subsection III-B)
Stage III: Each end-user determines its bandwidth demand from one operator
Fig. 2. Three-stage dynamic game: the duopoly’s leasing and pricing, and
the users’ resource allocation
TABLE I
KEY NOTATIONS
Notations Physical Meaning
Bi, Bj Leasing bandwidths of operators i and j
Ci, Cj Costs per unit bandwidth paid by operators i and j
pi, pj Prices per unit bandwidth announced by operators
i and j
K = {1, . . . ,K} Set of the users in the cognitive network
Pmax
k
User k’s maximum transmission power
hk User k’s channel gain between its transceiver
n0 Noise power per unit bandwidth
gk = P
max
k
hk/n0 User k’s wireless characteristic
G =
∑
k∈K gk The users’ aggregate wireless characteristics
wki, wkj User k’s bandwidth allocation from operator i or j
rk User k’s data rate
KPi ,K
P
j Preferred user sets of operators i and j
Di,Dj Preferred demands of operators i and j
KRi ,K
R
j Realized user sets of operators i and j
Qi, Qj Realized demands of operators i and j
Ri, Rj Revenues of operators i and j
pii, pij Profits of operators i and j
Tpi Total profit of both operators
prices to the users in Stage II. Finally, each user chooses to
purchase bandwidth from only one operator to maximize its
payoff in Stage III.
The key notations of the paper are listed in Table I. Some
are explained as follows.
• Leasing decisions Bi and Bj : leasing bandwidths of
operators i and j in Stage I, respectively.
• Costs Ci and Cj : the fixed positive leasing costs per unit
bandwidth for operators i and j, respectively. These costs
are determined by the negotiation between the operators
and their own spectrum suppliers.
• Pricing decisions pi and pj: prices per unit bandwidth
charged by operators i and j to the users in Stage II,
respectively.
• The User k’s demand wki or wkj : the bandwidth demand
of a user k ∈ K from operator i or j. A user can only
purchase bandwidth from one operator.
III. BACKWARD INDUCTION OF THE THREE-STAGE GAME
A common approach of analyzing dynamic game is back-
ward induction [30]. We start with Stage III and analyze the
users’ behaviors given the operators’ investment and pricing
decisions. Then we look at Stage II and analyze how operators
make the pricing decisions taking the users’ demands in Stage
III into consideration. Finally, we look at the operators’ leasing
decisions in Stage I knowing the results in Stages II and III.
Throughout the paper, we will use “bandwidth”, “spectrum”,
and “resource” interchangeably.
A. Spectrum Allocation in Stage III
In Stage III, each user needs to make the following two
decisions based on the prices pi and pj announced by the
operators in Stage II:
1) Which operator to choose?
2) How much to purchase?
OFDM has been deemed appropriate for dynamic spectrum
sharing (e.g., [31], [32]). We assume that the users share the
spectrum using OFDM to avoid mutual interferences. If a user
k ∈ K obtains bandwidth wki from operator i, then it achieves
a data rate (in nats) of
rk(wki) = wki ln
(
1 +
Pmaxk hk
n0wki
)
, (1)
where Pmaxk is user k’s maximum transmission power, n0
is the noise power density, hk is the channel gain between
user k’s transmitter and receiver [33]. The channel gain hk
is independent of the operator, as the operator only sells
bandwidth and does not provide a physical infrastructure.2
Here we assume that user k spreads its power Pmaxk across the
entire allocated bandwidth wki. To simplify later discussions,
we let
gk = P
max
k hk/n0,
thus gk/wki is the user k’s SNR. The rate in (1) is calculated
based on the Shannon capacity.
To better obtain insights through closed-form solutions, we
first focus on the high SNR regime where SNR≫ 1. This will
be the case where a user has limited choices of modulation
and coding schemes, and thus can not decode a transmission
if the SNR is below some threshold. In the high SNR regime,
the rate in (1) can be approximated as
rk(wki) = wki ln
(
gk
wki
)
. (2)
Although the analytical solutions in Section III are derived
based on (2), we will show later in Section V that all major
engineering insights remain true in the general SNR regime.
If a user k purchases bandwidth wki from operator i, it
receives a payoff of
uk(pi, wki) = wki ln
(
gk
wki
)
− piwki, (3)
which is the difference between the data rate and the payment.
The payment is proportional to price pi announced by operator
i. Payoff uk(pi, wki) is concave in wki, and the unique demand
that maximizes the payoff is
w∗ki(pi) = arg max
wki≥0
uk(pi, wki) = gke
−(1+pi). (4)
Demand w∗ki(pi) is always positive, linear in gk, and decreas-
ing in price pi. Since gk is linear in channel gain hk and
2We also assume that the channel condition is independent of transmission
frequencies, such as in the current 802.11d/e standard [34] where the channels
are formed by interleaving over the tones. As a result, each user experiences
a flat fading over the entire spectrum.
4transmission power Pmaxk , then a user with a better channel
condition or a larger transmission power has a larger demand.
It is clear that w∗ki(pi) is upper-bounded by gke−1 for any
choice of price pi ≥ 0. In other words, even if operator
i announces a zero price, user k will not purchase infinite
amount of resource since it can not decode the transmission
if SNRk = gk/wki is low.
Eqn (4) shows that every user purchasing bandwidth from
operator i obtains the same SNR
SNRk =
gk
w∗ki(pi)
= e(1+pi),
and obtains a payoff linear in gk
uk(pi, w
∗
ki(pi)) = gke
−(1+pi).
1) Which Operator to Choose?: Next we explain how each
user decides which operator to purchase from. The following
definitions help the discussions.
Definition 1 (Preferred User Set): The Preferred User Set
KPi includes the users who prefer to purchase from operator
i.
Definition 2 (Preferred Demand): The Preferred Demand
Di is the total demand from users in the preferred user set
KPi , i.e.,
Di(pi, pj) =
∑
k∈KP
i
(pi,pj)
gke
−(1+pi). (5)
The notations in (5) imply that both set KPi and demand Di
only depend on prices (pi, pj) in Stage II and are independent
of operators’ leasing decisions (Bi, Bj) in Stage I. Such
dependance can be discussed in two cases:
1) Different Prices (pi < pj): every user k ∈ K prefers to
purchase from operator i since
uk(pi, w
∗
ki(pi)) > uk(pj , w
∗
kj(pj)).
We have KPi = K and KPj = ∅, and
Di(pi, pj) = Ge
−(1+pi) and Dj(pi, pj) = 0,
where G =
∑
k∈K gk represents the aggregate wireless
characteristics of the users. This notation will be used
heavily later in the paper.
2) Same Prices (pi = pj = p): every user k ∈ K is
indifferent between the operators and randomly chooses
one with equal probability. In this case,
Di(p, p) = Dj(p, p) = Ge
−(1+p)/2.
Now let us discuss how much demand an operator can
actually satisfy, which depends on the bandwidth investment
decisions (Bi, Bj) in Stage I. It is useful to define the
following terms.
Definition 3 (Realized User Set): The Realized User Set
KRi includes the users whose demands are satisfied by operator
i.
Definition 4 (Realized Demand): The Realized Demand Qi
is the total demand of users in the Realized User Set KRi , i.e.,
Qi (Bi, Bj , pi, pj) =
∑
k∈KR
i
(Bi,Bj ,pi,pj)
gke
−(1+pi). (6)
Notice that both KRi and Qi depend on prices (pi, pj) in
Stage II and leasing decisions (Bi, Bj) in Stage I. Calculating
the Realized Demands also requires considering two different
pricing cases.
1) Different prices (pi < pj): The Preferred Demands are
Di(pi, pj) = Ge
−(1+pi) and Dj(pi, pj) = 0.
• If Operator i has enough resource
(i.e., Bi ≥ Di (pi, pj)): all Preferred Demand
will be satisfied by operator i. The Realized
Demands are
Qi = min(Bi, Di(pi, pj)) = Ge
−(1+pi),
Qj = 0.
• If Operator i has limited resource
(i.e., Bi < Di (pi, pj)): since operator i cannot
satisfy the Preferred Demand, some demand
will be satisfied by operator j if it has
enough resource. Since the realized demand
Qi(Bi, Bj , pi, pj) = Bi =
∑
k∈KR
i
gke
−(1+pi)
,
then
∑
k∈KR
i
gk = Bie
1+pi
. The remaining users
want to purchase bandwidth from operator j with
a total demand of
(
G−Bie1+pi
)
e−(1+pj). Thus
the Realized Demands are
Qi = min(Bi, Di(pi, pj)) = Bi,
Qj = min
(
Bj ,
(
G−Bie1+pi
)
e−(1+pj)
)
.
2) Same prices (pi = pj = p): both operators will attract
the same Preferred Demand Ge−(1+p)/2. The Realized
Demands are
Qi = min (Bi, Di(p, p) + max (Dj(p, p)−Bj , 0))
= min
(
Bi,
G
2e1+p
+max
(
G
2e1+p
−Bj , 0
))
,
Qj = min (Bj , Dj(p, p) + max (Di(p, p)−Bi, 0))
= min
(
Bj ,
G
2e1+p
+max
(
G
2e1+p
−Bi, 0
))
.
B. Operators’ Pricing Competition in Stage II
In Stage II, the two operators simultaneously determine their
prices (pi, pj) considering the users’ preferred demands in
Stage III, given the investment decisions (Bi, Bj) in Stage
I.
An operator i’s profit is
πi(Bi, Bj , pi, pj) = piQi(Bi, Bj , pi, pj)−BiCi, (7)
which is the difference between the revenue and the total cost.
Since the payment BiCi is fixed at this stage, operator i wants
to maximize the revenue piQi.
Game 1 (Pricing Game): The competition between the two
operators in Stage II can be modeled as the following game:
• Players: two operators i and j.
• Strategy space: operator i can choose price pi from the
feasible set Pi = [0,∞). Similarly for operator j.
• Payoff function: operator i wants to maximize the revenue
piQi(Bi, Bj , pi, pj). Similarly for operator j.
5Fig. 3. Pricing equilibrium types in different (Bi, Bj ) regions
At an equilibrium of the pricing game, (p∗i , p∗j), each
operator maximizes its payoff assuming that the other operator
chooses the equilibrium price, i.e.,
p∗i = arg max
pi∈Pi
piQi(Bi, Bj, pi, p
∗
j ), i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
In other words, no operator wants to unilaterally change its
pricing decision at an equilibrium.
Next we will investigate the existence and uniqueness of
the pricing equilibrium. First, we show that it is sufficient to
only consider symmetric pricing equilibrium for Game 1.
Proposition 1: Assume both operators lease positive band-
width in Stage I, i.e., min (Bi, Bj) > 0. If pricing equilibrium
exists, it must be symmetric p∗i = p∗j .
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. The
intuition is that no operator will announce a price higher than
its competitor in a fear of losing its Preferred Demand. This
property significantly simplifies the search for all possible
equilibria.
Next we show that the symmetric pricing equilibrium is a
function of (Bi, Bj) as shown in Fig. 3.
Theorem 1: The equilibria of the pricing game are as fol-
lows.
• Low Investment Regime: (Bi + Bj ≤ Ge−2 as in region
(L) of Fig. 3): there exists a unique nonzero pricing
equilibrium
p∗i (Bi, Bj) = p
∗
j (Bi, Bj) = ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1. (8)
The operators’ profits at Stage II are
πII,i(Bi, Bj) = Bi
(
ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1− Ci
)
, (9)
πII,j(Bi, Bj) = Bj
(
ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1− Cj
)
. (10)
• Medium Investment Regime (Bi + Bj > Ge−2 and
min(Bi, Bj) < Ge
−1 as in regions (M1)-(M3) of Fig.
3): there is no pricing equilibrium.
• High Investment Regime (min(Bi, Bj) ≥ Ge−1 as in
region (H) of Fig. 3): there exists a unique zero pricing
equilibrium
p∗i (Bi, Bj) = p
∗
j (Bi, Bj) = 0, (11)
and the operators’ profits are negative for any positive
values of Bi and Bj .
Proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. Intuitively,
higher investments in Stage I will lead to lower equilibrium
prices in Stage II. Theorem 1 shows that the only interesting
case is the low investment regime where both operators’ total
investment is no larger than Ge−2, in which case there exists
a unique positive symmetric pricing equilibrium. Notice that
same prices at equilibrium do not imply same profits, as the
operators can have different costs (Ci and Cj) and thus can
make different investment decisions (Bi and Bj) as shown
next.
C. Operators’ Leasing Strategies in Stage I
In Stage I, the operators need to decide the leasing amounts
(Bi, Bj) to maximize their profits. Based on Theorem 1, we
only need to consider the case where the total bandwidth of
both the operators is no larger than Ge−2.
Game 2 (Investment Game): The competition between the
two operators in Stage I can be modeled as the following
game:
• Players: two operators i and j.
• Strategy space: the operators will choose (Bi, Bj) from
the set B = {(Bi, Bj) : Bi + Bj ≤ Ge−2}. Notice that
the strategy space is coupled across the operators, but the
operators do not cooperate with each other.
• Payoff function: the operators want to maximize their
profits in (9) and (10), respectively.
At an equilibrium of the investment game, (B∗i , B∗j ), each
operator has maximized its payoff assuming that the other
operator chooses the equilibrium investment, i.e.,
B∗i = arg max
0≤Bi≤Ge−2−B∗j
πII,i(Bi, B
∗
j ), i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
To calculate the investment equilibria of Game 2, we can
first calculate operator i’s best response given operator j’s (not
necessarily equilibrium) investment decision, i.e.,
B∗i (Bj) = arg max
0≤Bi≤Ge−2−Bj
πII,i(Bi, Bj), i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
By looking at operator i’s profit in (9), we can see that a larger
investment decision Bi will lead to a smaller price. The best
choice of Bi will achieve the best tradeoff between a large
bandwidth and a small price.
After obtaining best investment responses of duopoly, we
can then calculate the investment equilibria, given different
costs Ci and Cj .
Theorem 2: The duopoly investment (leasing) equilibria in
Stage I are summarized as follows.
• Low Costs Regime (0 < Ci + Cj ≤ 1, as region (L) in
Fig. 4): there exists infinitely many investment equilibria
characterized by
B∗i = ρGe
−2, B∗j = (1− ρ)Ge−2, (12)
where ρ can be any value that satisfies
Cj ≤ ρ ≤ 1− Ci. (13)
6Fig. 4. Leasing equilibrium types in different (Ci, Cj ) regions
The operators’ profits are
πLI,i = B
∗
i (1− Ci), (14)
πLI,j = B
∗
j (1− Cj), (15)
where “L” denotes the low costs regime.
• High Comparable Costs Regime (Ci+Cj > 1 and |Cj −
Ci| ≤ 1, as region (HC) in Fig. 4): there exists a unique
investment equilibrium
B∗i =
(1 + Cj − Ci)G
2
e−
Ci+Cj+3
2 , (16)
B∗j =
(1 + Ci − Cj)G
2
e−
Ci+Cj+3
2 . (17)
The operators’ profits are
πHCI,i =
(
1 + Cj − Ci
2
)2
Ge
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
, (18)
πHCI,j =
(
1 + Ci − Cj
2
)2
Ge
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
, (19)
where “HC” denotes the high comparable costs regime.
• High Incomparable Costs Regime (Cj > 1+Ci or Ci >
1 + Cj , as regions (HI) and (HI ′) in Fig. 4): For the
case of Cj > 1 + Ci, there exists a unique investment
equilibrium with
B∗i = Ge
−(2+Ci), B∗j = 0, (20)
i.e., operator i acts as the monopolist and operator j is
out of the market. The operators’ profits are
πHII,i = Ge
−(2+Ci), πHII,j = 0, (21)
where “HI” denotes the high incomparable costs. The
case of Ci > 1 + Cj can be analyzed similarly.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix D. Let us
further discuss the properties of the investment equilibrium in
three different costs regimes.
1) Low Costs Regime (0 < Ci + Cj ≤ 1): In this case,
both the operators have very low costs. It is the best response
for each operator to lease as much as possible. However, since
the strategy set in the Investment Game is coupled across the
operators (i.e., B = {(Bi, Bj) : Bi + Bj ≤ Ge−2}), there
exist infinitely many ways for the operators to achieve the
maximum total leasing amount Ge−2. We can further identify
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the focal point, i.e., the equilibrium that the operators will
agree on without prior communications [30].
For our problem, the Focal Point should be Pareto efficient
and fair to the operators. It is easy to check that all investment
equilibria are Pareto efficient. And fairness can be interpreted
as in terms of either equal investments or equal profits. Due to
space limitations, we will discuss the choice of Focal Points
to reach equal investments. The case of equal profits can be
derived in a very similar fashion and is omitted here due to
space limitations.
We illustrate two types of Focal Points in Fig. 5 and 6.
The axes represent the equilibrium investment amounts for
two operators. The solid line segments represent the set of
infinitely many investment equilibrium. The constraints in (13)
determine the starting and ending points of the segments.
• Figure 5: when max(Ci, Cj) ≤ 1/2, equal leasing
amount (B∗i , B
∗
j ) = (Ge
−2/2, Ge−2/2) at point A1 is
one of the equilibria and thus is the Focal Point.
• Figure 6: when max(Ci, Cj) > 1/2, it is not possible
for the two operators to lease the same amount at the
equilibrium. The two separate solid line segments rep-
resent the two cases of (Ci > 1/2, Cj < 1/2) and
(Ci < 1/2, Cj > 1/2), respectively. For the case 1
of (Ci > 1/2, Cj < 1/2) (the higher left solid line
segment), the point A3 that has the smallest difference be-
tween two equilibrium investment amounts is Focal Point,
where we have (B∗i , B∗j ) =
(
(1− Ci)Ge−2, CiGe−2
)
.
7TABLE II
OPERATORS’ AND USERS’ BEHAVIORS AT THE EQUILIBRIA (ASSUMINGCi ≤ Cj )
Costs regimes Low costs: High comparable costs: High incomparable costs:
Ci + Cj ≤ 1 Ci + Cj > 1 and Cj − Ci ≤ 1 Cj > 1 + Ci
Number of equilibria Infinite Unique Unique
Investment equilibria (ρGe−2, (1 − ρ)Ge−2),
(
(1+Cj−Ci)G
2e
Ci+Cj+3
2
,
(1+Ci−Cj)G
2e
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
(Ge−(2+Ci), 0)
(B∗i , B
∗
j ) with Cj ≤ ρ ≤ (1 − Ci)
Pricing equilibrium (p∗i , p∗j ) (1, 1)
(
Ci+Cj+1
2
,
Ci+Cj+1
2
)
(1 + Ci, N/A)
Profits (piI,i, piI,j) pi
L
I,i = ρ(1 − Ci)Ge
−2
, piHCI,i =
(
1+Cj−Ci
2
)2
Ge
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
, piHII,i = Ge
−(2+Ci),
piLI,j = (1 − ρ)(1 − Cj)Ge
−2 piHCI,j =
(
1+Ci−Cj
2
)2
Ge
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
piHII,j = 0
User k’s bandwidth demand gke−2 gke
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
gke
−(2+Ci)
User k’s SNR e2 e
Ci+Cj+3
2 e2+Ci
User k’s payoff gke−2 gke
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
gke
−(2+Ci)
Similarly, point A2 is another Focal Point for the case 2
of (Ci < 1/2, Cj > 1/2).
2) High Comparable Costs Regime (Ci + Cj > 1 and
|Cj −Ci| ≤ 1): First, the high costs discourage the operators
from leasing aggressively, thus the total investment is less
than Ge−2. Second, the operators’ costs are comparable, and
thus the operator with the slightly lower cost does not have
sufficient power to drive the other operator out of the market.
3) High Incomparable Costs Regime (Cj > 1 + Ci or
Ci > 1 + Cj): First, the costs are high and thus the total
investment of two operators is less than Ge−2. Second, the
costs of the two operators are so different that the operator
with the much higher cost is driven out of the market. As a
result, the remaining operator thus acts as a monopolist.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM SUMMARY
Based on the discussions in Section III, we summarize the
equilibria of the three-stage game in Table II, which includes
the operators’ investment decisions, pricing decisions, and the
resource allocation to the users. Without loss of generality, we
assume Ci ≤ Cj in Table II. The equilibrium for Ci > Cj
can be decribed similarly.
Several interesting observations are as follows.
Observation 1: The operators’ equilibrium investment de-
cisions B∗i and B∗j are linear in the users’ aggregate wireless
characteristics G
(
=
∑
k∈K gk =
∑
k∈K P
max
k hk/n0
)
.
This shows that the operators’ total investment increases
with the user population, users’ channel gains, and users’
transmission powers.
Observation 2: The symmetric equilibrium price p∗i = p∗j
does not depend on users’ wireless characteristics.
Observations 1 and 2 are closely related. Since the total
investment is linearly proportional to the users’ aggregate
characteristics, the “average” equilibrium resource allocation
per user is “constant” and does not depend on the user
population. Since resource allocation is determined by the
price, this means that the price is also independent of the user
population and wireless characteristics.
Observation 3: The operators’ equilibrium investment and
pricing decisions follow simple linear threshold structures,
which are easy to implement in practice.
For equilibrium investment decisions in Stage I, the feasible
set of investment costs can be divided into three regions
by simple linear thresholds as in Fig. 4. As leasing costs
increase, operators invest less aggressively; as the leasing cost
difference increases, the operator with a lower cost gradually
dominates the spectrum market. For the equilibrium pricing
decisions, the feasible set of leasing bandwidths is also divided
into three regions by simple linear thresholds as well. A
meaningful pricing equilibrium exists only when the total
available bandwidth from the two operators is no larger than
a threshold (see Fig. 3).
Observation 4: Each user k’s equilibrium demand is posi-
tive, linear in its wireless characteristic gk, and decreasing in
the price. Each user k achieves the same SNR independent of
gk, and obtains a payoff linear in gk.
Observation 4 shows that the users receive fair resource
allocation and QoS. Such allocation does not depend on the
wireless characteristics of the other users.
Observation 5: In the High Incomparable Costs Regime,
users’ equilibrium SNR increases with the costs Ci and Cj ,
and the equilibrium payoffs decrease with the costs.
As the costs Ci and Cj increase, the pricing equilibrium
(p∗i = p∗j ) increases to compensate the loss of the operators’
profits due to increased costs. As a result, each user will
purchase less bandwidth from the operators. Since a user
spreads its total power across the entire allocated bandwidth, a
smaller bandwidth means a higher SNR but a smaller payoff.
Finally, we observe that the users achieve a high SNR at the
equilibrium. The minimum equilibrium SNR that users achieve
among the three costs regime is e2. In this case, the ratio
between the high SNR approximation and Shannon capacity,
ln(SNR)/ ln(1 + SNR), is larger than 94%. This validates our
assumption on the high SNR regime. The next section, on the
other hand, shows that most of the insights remain valid in the
general SNR regime.
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V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS UNDER THE GENERAL SNR
REGIME
In Sections III and IV, we computed the equilibria of
the three-stage game based on the high SNR assumption in
(2), and obtained five important observations (Observations
1-5). The high SNR assumption enables us to obtain closed-
form solutions of the equilibria analysis and clear engineering
insights.
In this section, we further consider the more general SNR
regime where a user’s rate is computed according to (1) instead
of (2). We will follow a similar backward induction analysis,
and extend Observations 1, 2, 4, 5, and pricing threshold
structure of Observation 3 to the general SNR regime.
We first examine the pricing equilibrium in Stage II.
Theorem 3: Define Bth := 0.462G. The pricing equilibria
in the general SNR regime are as follows.
• Low Investment Regime (Bi+Bj ≤ Bth as in region (L)
of Fig. 7): there exists a unique pricing equilibrium
p∗i (Bi, Bj) = p
∗
j(Bi, Bj)
= ln
(
1 +
G
Bi +Bj
)
− G
Bi +Bj +G
. (22)
The operators’ profits at Stage II are
πi(Bi, Bj) = Bi
[
ln
(
1 +
G
Bi +Bj
)
− G
Bi +Bj +G
− Ci
]
,
(23)
πj(Bi, Bj) = Bj
[
ln
(
1 +
G
Bi +Bj
)
− G
Bi +Bj +G
− Cj
]
.
(24)
• High Investment Regime (Bi + Bj > Bth as in region
(H) of Fig. 7): there is no pricing equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix E. This result is
similar to Theorem 1 in the high SNR regime, and shows that
the pricing equilibrium in the general SNR regime still has a
threshold structure in Observation 3. Based on Theorem 3, we
are ready to prove Observations 1, 2, 4, and 5 in the general
SNR regime.
Theorem 4: Observations 1, 2, 4, and 5 in Section IV still
hold for the general SNR regime.
Proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix F.
VI. IMPACT OF OPERATOR COMPETITION
We are interested in understanding the impact of operator
competition on the operators’ profits and the users’ payoffs.
 Stage I: A decision maker determines leasing amounts ܤ݅  and ݆ܤ
Stage II: A decision maker announces prices ݌݅  and ݌݆ to the market
Stage III: Each end-user determines its bandwidth demand from one operator
Fig. 8. The three-stage Stackelberg game for the coordinated operators
As a benchmark, we will consider the coordinated case
where both operators jointly make the investment and pricing
decisions to maximize their total profit. In this case, there does
not exists competition between the two operators. However, it
is still a Stackelberg game between a single decision maker
(representing both operators) and the users. Then we will
compare the equilibrium of this Stackelberg game with that
of the duopoly game as in Section IV.
A. Maximum Profit in the Coordinated Case
We analyze the coordinated case following a three stage
model as shown in Fig. 8. Compared with Fig. 2, the key
difference here is that a single decision maker makes the
decisions in both Stages I and II. In other words, the two
operators coordinate with each other.
Again we use backward induction to analyze the three-stage
game. The analysis of Stage III in terms of the spectrum
allocation among the users is the same as in Subsection III-A
(still assuming the high SNR regime), and we focus on Stages
II and I. Without loss of generality, we assume that Ci ≤ Cj .
In Stage II, the decision maker maximizes the following
total profit Tπ by determining prices pi and pj :
Tπ(Bi, Bj , pi, pj) = πi(Bi, Bj , pi, pj) + πj(Bi, Bj , pi, pj),
where πi(Bi, Bj , pi, pj) is given in (7) and πj(Bi, Bj , pi, pj)
can be obtained similarly.
Theorem 5: In Stage II, the optimal pricing decisions for
the coordinated operators are as follows:
• If Bi > 0 and Bj = 0, then operator i is the monopolist
and announces a price
pcoi (Bi, 0) = ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1. (25)
Similar result can be obtained if Bi = 0 and Bj > 0.
• If min(Bi, Bj) > 0, then both operator i and j announce
the same price
pcoi (Bi, Bj) = p
co
j (Bi, Bj) = ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1. (26)
Proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix G. Theorem
5 shows that both operators will act together as a monopolist
in the pricing stage.
Now let us consider Stage I, where the decision maker
determines the leasing amounts Bi and Bj to maximize the
9total profit:
max
Bi,Bj≥0
Tπ(Bi, Bj)
= max
Bi,Bj≥0
Bi(p
co
i (Bi, Bj)− Ci) +Bj(pcoj (Bi, Bj)−Cj),
(27)
where pcoi (Bi, Bj) and pcoj (Bi, Bj) are given in Theorem 5. In
this case, operator j will not lease (i.e., Bcoj = 0) as operator
i can lease with a lower cost. Thus the optimization problem
in (27) degenerates to
max
Bi≥0
Tπ(Bi) = max
Bi≥0
Bi(p
co
i (Bi, 0)− Ci).
This leads to the following result.
Theorem 6: In Stage I, the optimal investment decisions for
the coordinated operators are
Bcoi (Ci, Cj) = Ge
−(2+Ci), Bcoj (Ci, Cj) = 0, (28)
and the total profit is
T coπ (Ci, Cj) = Ge
−(2+Ci). (29)
B. Impact of Competition on the Operators’ Profits
Let us compare the total profit obtained in the competitive
duopoly case (Theorem 2) and the coordinated case (Theorem
6).
1) Low Costs Regime (0 < Ci + Cj ≤ 1): First, the total
equilibrium leasing amount in the duopoly case is B∗i +B∗j =
Ge−2, which is larger than the total leasing amount Ge−(2+Ci)
in the coordinated case. In other words, operator competition
leads to a more aggressive overall investment. Second, the total
profit at the duopoly equilibria is
TLπ (Ci, Cj , ρ) = [ρ(1− Ci) + (1− ρ)(1− Cj)]Ge−2, (30)
where ρ can be any real value in the set of [Cj , 1−Ci]. Each
choice of ρ corresponds to an investment equilibrium and there
are infinitely many equilibria in this case as shown in Theorem
2. The minimum profit ratio between the duopoly case and the
coordinated case optimized over ρ is
Tπ − RatioL(Ci, Cj) = min
ρ∈[Cj ,1−Ci]
TLπ (Ci, Cj , ρ)
T coπ (Ci, Cj)
. (31)
Since TLπ (Ci, Cj , ρ) is increasing in ρ, the minimum profit
ratio is achieved at
ρ∗ = Cj . (32)
This means
Tπ − RatioL(Ci, Cj) = [Cj(1− Ci) + (1− Cj)2]eCi . (33)
Although (33) is a non-convex function of Ci and Cj , we
can numerically compute the minimum value over all possible
values of costs in this regime
min
(Ci,Cj):0<Ci+Cj≤1
Tπ − RatioL(Ci, Cj)
= lim
ǫ→0
Tπ − RatioL(ǫ, 0.5 + ǫ) = 0.75. (34)
This means that the total profit achieved at the duopoly
equilibrium is at least 75% of the total profit achieved in the
coordinated case under any choice of cost parameters in the
Low Costs Regime.
2) High Comparable Costs Regime (Ci + Cj > 1 and
Cj − Ci ≤ 1): First, the total duopoly equilibrium leasing
amount is B∗i + B∗j = Ge
−
(
Ci+Cj+3
2
)
which is greater than
Ge−(2+Ci) of the coordinated case. Again, competition leads
to a more aggressive overall investment. Second, the total
profit of duopoly is
THCπ (Ci, Cj) =
1 + (Cj − Ci)2
2
Ge−
Ci+Cj+3
2 . (35)
And the profit ratio is
Tπ − RatioHC(Ci, Cj) = T
HC
π (Ci, Cj)
T coπ (Ci, Cj)
=
1 + (Cj − Ci)2
2
e
1−(Cj−Ci)
2 , (36)
which is a function of the cost difference Cj − Ci. Let us
write it as Tπ − RatioHC(Cj − Ci). We can show that it is
a convex function and achieves its minimum at
min
(Ci,Cj):Ci+Cj>1,0≤Cj−Ci≤1
Tπ − RatioHC(Cj − Ci)
= Tπ − RatioHC(2 −
√
3) = 0.773. (37)
3) High Incomparable Costs Regime (Cj − Ci > 1): In
this case, only one operator leases a positive amount at the
duopoly equilibrium and achieves the same profit as in the
coordinated case. The profit ratio is 1.
We summarize the above results as follows.
Theorem 7 (Operators’ Profit Loss): Comparing with the
coordinated case, the operator competition leads to a maximum
total profit loss of 25% in the low costs regime.
Since low leasing costs lead to aggressive leasing decisions
and thus intensive competitions among operators, it is not
surprising to see that the maximum profit loss happens in the
low cost regime.
4) Further Intuitions of the Low Costs Regime:
Next we explain the intuitions behind the profit ratio
Tπ − RatioL(Ci, Cj) as in (33) in the low costs regime. We
can summarize the impact of costs in this regime as two
effects.
• Excessive Investment (EI) effect: when the cheaper cost
Ci increases under a fixed cost difference Cj − Ci, the
competition between the operators become more intense
due to the increase of both costs Ci and Cj . The ratio
between the total leasing amount at the duopoly equilib-
rium and the coordinated case tends to increase with the
costs. Such (relatively) excessive investment leads to a
higher total payment of the operators to spectrum owners
(than the coordinated case). Such effect tends to decrease
the profit ratio with an increasing Ci.
• Cheaper Resource (CR) effect: when the cheaper cost Ci
increases under some fixed cost difference Cj − Ci, the
worst-case choice of ρ∗ in (32) also increases due to the
increase of Cj . This leads to more investment from the
spectrum owner with cheaper cost Ci, and is closer to
the decision in the coordinated case where the operators
only invest in the cheaper resource. Such effect tends to
increase the profit ratio with an increasing Ci.
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Fig. 9. Profit ratio Tpi − Ratio(Ci, Cj) versus the lower cost Ci under
different cost differences Cj − Ci
Fig. 10. Excessive Investment (EI) effect versus Cheaper Resource (CR)
effect under different cost difference Cj − Ci
Figure 9 shows three total profit ratio curves
(Tπ − Ratio(Ci, Cj)). For each curve, the constant part
on the right hand side corresponds to the high comparable
costs (HC) regime as in (36), where Tπ − Ratio is a function
of the cost difference Cj − Ci only. The nonlinear part on
the left hand side corresponds to the low costs regime. The
interactions between the EI and CR effects lead to different
shapes of the three curves in the low costs regime.
• Small cost difference (e.g., Cj − Ci = 0 in Fig. 9): the
Excessive Investment effect dominates. The profit ratio
decreases monotonically with the cost Ci.
• Medium cost difference (e.g., Cj − Ci = 0.3 in Fig. 9):
both effects have comparable impacts. The profit ratio
increases first and then decreases with cost Ci.
• Large cost difference (Cj − Ci = 0.8 in Fig. 9): the
Cheaper Resource effect dominates. The profit ratio in-
creases monotonically with the cost Ci.
We can numerically calculate the thresholds that separate the
three different effects interaction regions as in Fig. 10. Exces-
sive Investment (EI) effect dominates if (Cj −Ci) ∈ (0, 171],
and CR effect dominates if (Cj − Ci) ∈ [0.407, 1]. The two
effects have comparable impacts if (Cj−Ci) ∈ (0.171, 0.407).
C. Impact of Competition on the Users’ Payoffs
Theorem 8: Comparing with the coordinated case, users ob-
tain same or higher payoffs under the operators’ competition.
By substituting (28) into (25), we obtain the optimal price in
the coordinated case as 1+Ci. This means that user k’s payoff
equals to gke−(2+Ci) in all three costs regimes. According
to Table II, users in the duopoly competition case have the
same payoffs as in coordinated case in the high incomparable
costs regime. The payoffs are larger in the other two costs
regimes with the competitor competition. The intuition is that
operator competition in those two regimes leads to aggressive
investments, which results in lower prices and higher user
payoffs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Dynamic spectrum leasing enables the secondary cognitive
network operators to quickly obtain the unused resources from
the primary spectrum owner and provide flexible services
to secondary end-users. This paper studies the competition
between two cognitive operators and examines the operators’
equilibrium investment and pricing decisions as well as the
users’ corresponding QoS and payoffs.
We model the economic interactions between the operators
and the users as a three-stage dynamic game. Our concrete
OFDM-based spectrum sharing model captures the wireless
heterogeneity of the users in terms of maximum transmission
power levels and channel gains. The two operators engage in
investment and pricing competitions with asymmetric costs.
We have discovered several interesting features of the game’s
equilibria. For example, the duopoly’s investment and pricing
decisions have nice linear threshold structures. We also study
the impact of operator competition on operators’ total profit
loss and the users’ payoff increases. Compared with the coor-
dinated case where the two operators cooperate to maximize
their total profit, we show that at the maximum profit loss due
to competition is no larger than 25%. We also show that the
users always benefit from competition by achieving the same
or better payoffs. Although we have focused on the high SNR
regime when obtaining closed-form solutions, we show that
most engineering insights summarized in Section IV still hold
in the general SNR regime.
There are several possible ways to extend the results here.
We can consider the case where the operators can also obtain
resource through spectrum sensing as in [27]. Compared with
leasing, sensing is cheaper but the amount of useful spectrum
is less predictable due to the primary users’ stochastic traffic.
With the possibility of sensing, we need to consider a four-
stage dynamic game model. We can also consider the case
where users might experience different channel conditions
when they choose different providers, e.g., when they need
to communicate with the base stations of the operators. Com-
petition under such channel heterogeneity has been partially
considered in [35] without considering the cost of spectrum
acquisition.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
If the two operators announce different prices, then the
operator with the lower price attracts all the users’ demand
and essentially acts as a monopolist. We will first summarize
the pricing behavior of a monopolist, and detailed derivations
are given in [27]. After that, we will show the main proof.
1) Monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy: Given a fixed
leasing amount B, the monopolist wants to choose the price
p to maximize its revenue. Denote the demand of user k as
w∗k(p), and thus the total demand is
∑
k∈K w
∗
k(p). The revenue
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is pmin
(
B,
∑
k∈K w
∗
k(p)
)
. In Fig. 11, the nonlinear curve
represents the function p
∑
k∈K w
∗
k(p). The other two linear
curves represent two representative values of pB. To maximize
the revenue, we will have the following two cases:
• Monopolist’s low supply regime: if B ≤ Ge−2 (e.g., BL
in Fig. 11), then it is optimal to choose a price such that
supply equals to demand,
p∗(B) = ln
(
G
B
)
− 1.
• Monopolist’s high supply regime: if B ≥ Ge−2 (e.g., BH
in Fig. 11), then it is optimal to choose a price such that
supply exceeds demand,
p∗(B) = 1.
2) Main proof: Now let us consider the two operator case.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium (p∗i , p∗j ) where p∗i 6=
p∗j . Without loss of generality, we assume that Bi ≤ Bj . In the
following analysis, we examine all possible (Bi, Bj) regions
labeled (a)-(f ) as shown in Fig. 12.
(a) If Bj ≥ Bi ≥ Ge−1, then both the operators have
adequate bandwidths to cover the total preferred demand.
This is because the total preferred demand to an operator
i has the maximum value of Di(0, pj) = Ge−1. Thus
any operator announcing a lower price will attract all
the demand. The operator charging a higher price has no
realized demand , and thus has the incentive to reduce
the price until no larger than other price. Thus unequal
price is not an equilibrium.
(b) If Ge−2 < Bi < Ge−1 ≤ Bj , operator i will not
announce a price higher than operator j for the same
reason as in case (a). Furthermore, the operator j will
not announce a price pj > 1. Otherwise, the operator i
will act like a monopolist by setting pi = 1 to maximize
its revenue and leave no realized demand to operator j.
Thus we conclude that p∗i < p∗j ≤ 1. But operator iwants
to set price p∗i = p∗j − ǫ where ǫ > 0 is infinitely small,
and thus can not reach an equilibrium.
(c) If Bi ≤ Ge−2 < Ge−1 ≤ Bj , then operator i will not
announce a price higher than operator j as in case (a).
Also operator j will not charge a price p∗j > ln
(
G
Bi
)
−1,
otherwise operator i will act like a monopolist by setting
pi = ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1 to maximize its revenue and leave no
realized demand to operator j. Thus we conclude that
p∗i < p
∗
j ≤ ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1. However, the operator i wants
to set price p∗i = p∗j − ǫ where ǫ > 0 is infinitely small,
and thus can not reach an equilibrium.
(d) If Ge−2 ≤ Bi ≤ Bj < Ge−1, duopoly will not announce
price max(p∗i , p∗j ) > 1. Thus we have either p∗i < p∗j ≤ 1
or p∗j < p
∗
i ≤ 1. In both cases, the operator with the
higher price wants to reduce the price to be just a little
bit smaller than the other operator’s, and thus can not
reach an equilibrium.
(e) If Bi ≤ Ge−2 ≤ Bj < Ge−1, then we have p∗i ≤ 1
and p∗j ≤ ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1. Thus we have either p∗i <
p∗j ≤ ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1 or p∗j < p∗i ≤ 1. Similar as (d), an
equilibrium can not be reached.
(f) If Bi ≤ Bj ≤ Ge−2, then we have p∗i ≤ ln
(
G
Bj
)
− 1
and p∗j ≤ ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1. Thus we have either p∗i < p∗j ≤
ln
(
G
Bi
)
−1 or ln
(
G
Bj
)
−1 ≥ p∗i > p∗j . In both cases, the
operator with the higher price wants to reduce the price
to be just a little bit smaller than the other operator’s, and
thus can not reach an equilibrium.
Similar analysis can be extended to regions (a′)-(f ′) in
Fig. 12. Thus in all all possible (Bi, Bj) regions, there doesn’t
exist a pricing equilibrium such that p∗i 6= p∗j .
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Assume, without loss of generality, that Bi ≤ Bj . Based
on Proposition 1, in the following analysis we examine all
possible (Bi, Bj) regions labeled (a)-(f) in Fig. 12, and check
if there exists a symmetric pricing equilibrium (i.e., p∗i = p∗j )
in each region.
(a) If Bj ≥ Bi ≥ Ge−1, both the operators have adequate
bandwidths to cover the total preferred demand which
reaches its maximum Ge−1 at zero price.
– if p∗i = p∗j > 0, then operator i attracts and realizes
half of the total preferred demand. But when operator
i slightly decreases its price, it attracts and realizes
the total preferred demand, and thus doubles its
revenue.
– if p∗i = p∗j = 0, any operator can not attract or realize
any preferred demand by unilaterally deviating from
(increasing) its price.
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Hence, p∗i = p∗j = 0 is the unique equilibrium in region
(a).
(b-c) If Bi ≤ Ge−2 < Ge−1 ≤ Bj or Ge−2 < Bi < Ge−1 ≤
Bj , operator j has adequate bandwidth while operator i
only has limited bandwidth.
– if p∗i = p∗j > 0, then operator j will slightly reduce
its price to attract and realize the total preferred
demand.
– if p∗i = p∗j = 0, then operator j will increase its
price and still have positive realized demand. This is
because operator i does not have enough supply to
satisfy the total preferred demand.
Hence, there doesn’t exist an equilibrium in regions (b-c).
(d-e) If Ge−2 ≤ Bi ≤ Bj < Ge−1 or Bi ≤ Ge−2 ≤ Bj <
Ge−1, we have shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that
possible pricing equilibrium will not exceed 1. We find
possible pricing equilibrium given operator j’s leasing
amount.
– if p∗i = p∗j > ln
(
G
Bj
)
−1, then operator j has enough
bandwidth to cover the total preferred demand and
it will slightly decrease its price to attract a larger
preferred demand.
– if p∗i = p∗j ≤ ln
(
G
Bj
)
−1, then operator j has limited
bandwidth and it will make decision depending on
operator i’s supply.
∗ if Bi ≤ Ge−(1+p∗j )/2, then operator j will slightly
decrease its price if Bi + Bj > Ge−(1+p
∗
j ), or
increase its price to 1 if Bi +Bj ≤ Ge−(1+p∗j ).
∗ if Bi > Ge−(1+p∗j )/2, then operator j will slightly
reduce its price.
Hence, there doesn’t exist a pricing equilibrium in regions
(d-e).
(f) If Bi ≤ Bj ≤ Ge−2, we will first show that total supply
equals total preferred demand at any possible equilibrium
(i.e., p∗i = p∗j = ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1).
– Suppose that at an equilibrium p∗i = p∗j <
ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1 and thus the total supply is less
than the total preferred demand. Then operator j will
slightly increase its price without changing much its
realized demand, and thus receive a greater revenue.
– Suppose that at an equilibrium p∗i = p∗j ≥
ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1 and thus the total supply is greater
than the total preferred demand. Thus we have
Bj > Ge
−(1+p∗j )/2. Operator j will slightly reduce
its price to attract much more preferred demand and
receive a greater revenue.
Thus we have p∗i = p∗j = ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1 at any
possible equilibrium. Then we check if such (p∗i , p∗j ) is
an equilibrium for the following two cases.
– If Bi + Bj > Ge−2, then we have p∗i = p∗j < 1.
Since operator j already has its individual supply
equal to its realized demand, then operator i acts as a
monopolist serving its own users in the monopolist’s
high investment regime in the proof of Proposition
1. Then operator i will increase its price to 1.
– If Bi + Bj ≤ Ge−2, then we have p∗i = p∗j ≥ 1.
Each operator acts as a monopolist serving its own
users in the monopolist’s low investment regime in
the proof of Proposition 1. And it’s optimal for each
operator to stick with its current price.
Thus there exists a unique pricing equilibrium p∗i = p∗j =
ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
−1 for the low investment regime Bi+Bj ≤
Ge−2 in region (f ).
The same results can be extended to symmetric regions (a′)-
(f ′) in Fig. 12.
C. The Operators’ Best Investment Responses with Proof
Due to the concavity of profit πII,i(Bi, Bj) in Bi, we
can obtain the best response function (i.e., best choice of
Bi given fixed Bj) by checking the first order condition.
The best response of operator i depends on cost Ci and
the leasing decision of its competitor, Bj . Operator i’s best
response investment is summarized in Table III. Operator j’s
best response can be calculated similarly.
Proof. Since πII,i(Bi, Bj) in (9) is a concave function of
Bi, it is enough to check the first order condition as well as
the boundary condition. We have
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
= ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− Bi
Bi +Bj
− 1− Ci.
Its values at the boundary of operator i’s strategy space are
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=0= ln
(
G
Bj
)
− 1− Ci,
and
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=Ge−2−Bj=
Bj
Ge−2
− Ci,
both of which are dependent on its competitor j’s strategy Bj
and the cost Ci. Thus we derive operator i’s best response for
different costs Ci and operator j’s strategies as follows.
• Low individual cost regime (Ci ≤ 1), then
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=0≥ 0,
i.e., operator i is encouraged to lease positive amount.
This is because that in low investment regime the pricing
equilibrium in (8) is always larger than 1 and thus larger
than Ci, and the profit per unit leased bandwidth is
positive.
– Large Competitor’s Decision (Bj ≥ CiGe−2), then
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=Ge−2−Bj≥ 0,
i.e., the large leasing amount of operator j already
makes the pricing equilibrium in (8) very low (but
still larger than 1). And operator i’s best response is
to lease as much bandwidth as possible
B∗i (Bj) = Ge
−2 −Bj ,
which will only leads to a relatively small decrease
of price.
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TABLE III
BEST INVESTMENT RESPONSEB∗i (Bj ) OF OPERATOR i IN STAGE I
Response B∗i (Bj) Low individual cost 0 < Ci ≤ 1 High individual cost Ci > 1
Small competitor’s decision Bj < CiGe−2 the solution to
∂piII,i(Bi,Bj)
∂Bi
= 0 N/A
Large competitor’s decision Bj ≥ CiGe−2 Ge−2 − Bj N/A
Small competitor’s decision Bj < Ge−(1+Ci) N/A the solution to
∂piII,i(Bi,Bj)
∂Bi
= 0
Large competitor’s decision Bj ≥ Ge−(1+Ci) N/A 0
– Small Competitor’s Decision (Bj < CiGe−2), then
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=Ge−2−Bj< 0,
i.e., operator i will not lease aggressively to avoid
making the price too low. Its best response B∗i (Bj)
is the unique solution to
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
= 0,
which lies in the strict interior of [0, Ge−2 −Bj).
• High individual cost regime (Ci > 1), then
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=Ge−2−Bj< 0,
i.e., the high cost makes operator i not lease the maximum
possible value.
– If Large Competitor’s Decision (Bj ≥ Ge−(1+Ci)),
then
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=0≤ 0,
i.e., the competitor j’s large leasing amount makes
the price low. Together with the high leasing cost, it
is optimal for operator i not to lease anything. Thus
we have
B∗i (Bj) = 0.
– Small Competitor’s Decision (Bj < Ge−(1+Ci)),
then
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=0> 0,
i.e., operator j’s limited leasing amount enables
operator i to lease positive amount despite of the
large leasing cost. And operator i’s best response
B∗i (Bj) is the unique solution to
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
= 0,
which lies in the strict interior of (0, Ge−2 −Bj).
D. Proof of Theorem 2
The best investment response of operator i is summarized
in Table III with detailed proof in Appendix C. An investment
equilibrium (B∗i , B∗j ) corresponds to a fixed iteration point of
two functions B∗i (Bj) and B∗j (Bi). In the following analysis,
we examine all possible costs (Ci, Cj ) regions labeled (I)-
(III) in Fig. 13, and check if there exists any equilibrium in
each region.
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Fig. 13. Different (Ci, Cj ) regions
(I) If Ci ≤ 1 and Cj ≤ 1, both the operators are in low
individual cost regime.
– If B∗i ≥ CjGe−2 and B∗j ≥ CiGe−2, there exist
infinitely many investment equilibria characterized
by (12) and (13). Since B∗i ≥ CjGe−2 and B∗j ≥
CiGe
−2
, Ci + Cj ≤ 1 is further required for
existence of equilibria.
– If B∗i < CjGe−2 and B∗j ≥ CiGe−2, then by
solving equations B∗i (B∗j ) = Ge−2 −B∗j , and
∂πII,j(Bi, Bj)
∂Bj
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i = CjGe−2 and B∗j = (1 − Cj)Ge−2.
But the value of B∗i is not smaller than CjGe−2.
– If B∗i ≥ CjGe−2 and B∗j < CiGe−2, we can also
show that there does not exist any equilibrium in this
case by a similar argument as above.
– If B∗i < CjGe−2 and B∗j < CiGe−2, then by
solving equations
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
∂πII,j(Bi, Bj)
∂Bj
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i in (16) and B∗j in (17). And Ci+Cj > 1
is further required for existence of this equilibrium.
Hence, in region (I), there exist infinitely many equilibria
satisfying (12) and (13) when Ci + Cj ≤ 1, and there
exists a unique equilibrium satisfying (16) and (17) when
Ci + Cj > 1.
(II) If Ci > 1 and 0 < Cj ≤ 1, operator i is in high
individual cost regime and operator j is in low individual
cost regime.
– If B∗i ≥ CjGe−2 and B∗j ≥ Ge−(1+Ci), then we
have B∗i = 0 and B∗j = Ge−2. But the value of B∗i
is not greater than CjGe−2.
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– If B∗i ≥ CjGe−2 and B∗j < Ge−(1+Ci), then by
solving equations B∗j (B∗i ) = Ge−2 −B∗i , and
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i = (1 − Ci)Ge−2 and B∗j = CiGe−2.
But the value of B∗j is not less than Ge−(1+Ci).
– If B∗i < CjGe−2 and B∗j ≥ Ge−(1+Ci), then by
solving equations B∗i (B∗j ) = 0, and
∂πII,j(Bi, Bj)
∂Bj
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i = 0 and B∗j = Ge−(2+Cj). And
Ci > 1 + Cj is further required for existence of
this equilibrium.
– B∗i < CjGe
−2 and B∗j < Ge−(1+Ci), then by
solving equations
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
∂πII,j(Bi, Bj)
∂Bj
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i in (16) and B∗j in (17). And Ci ≤ 1+Cj
is further required for existence of this equilibrium.
Hence, in region (II), there exists a unique investment
equilibrium (B∗i , B∗j ) satisfying (16) and (17) when Ci ≤
1 + Cj , and there exists a unique equilibrium satisfying
B∗i = 0 and B∗j = Ge−(2+Cj) when Ci > 1 + Cj .
(III) If Ci > 1 and Cj > 1, then both the operators are in
high individual cost regime.
– If B∗i < Ge−(1+Cj) and B∗j < Ge−(1+Ci), then by
solving equations
∂πII,i(Bi, Bj)
∂Bi
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
∂πII,j(Bi, Bj)
∂Bj
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i in (16) and B∗j in (17). And Ci − 1 <
Cj < Ci +1 is further required for existence of this
equilibrium.
– If B∗i < Ge−(1+Cj) and B∗j ≥ Ge−(1+Ci), then by
solving equations B∗i (B∗j ) = 0, and
∂πj(Bi, Bj)
∂Bj
|Bi=B∗i ,Bj=B∗j = 0,
we have B∗i = 0 and B∗j = Ge−(2+Cj). And
Cj ≤ Ci − 1 is further required for existence of
this equilibrium.
– If B∗i ≥ Ge−(1+Cj) and B∗j < Ge−(1+Ci), then
we can similarly show that there exists a unique
equilibrium B∗i = Ge−(2+Ci) and B∗j = 0 only
when Cj ≥ Ci + 1.
– If B∗i ≥ Ge−(1+Cj) and B∗j ≥ Ge−(1+Ci), then we
have B∗i = 0 and B∗j = 0. However, the value of B∗i
is not greater than Ge−(1+Cj).
Hence, in region (III), there exists a unique equilibrium
satisfying (16) and (17) when Ci − 1 < Cj < Ci + 1;
there exists a unique equilibrium satisfying B∗i = 0 and
B∗j = Ge
−(2+Cj) when Cj ≤ Ci − 1; and there exists a
unique equilibrium with B∗i = Ge−(2+Ci) and B∗j = 0
when Cj ≥ Ci + 1.
The same results can be extended to symmetric region
(II ′) in Fig. 13.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
In the following analysis, we will first derive the users’
optimal behaviors in general SNR regime under a single op-
erator case (monopoly), and then summarize the monopolist’s
optimal pricing decision. After that, we prove the symmetric
pricing structure for duopoly, and find the pricing equilibrium.
1) The users’ optimal behaviors in general SNR regime:
Let us write the price announced by the monopolist by p, and
the investment amount by B. By demanding bandwidth wk, a
user k’s payoff function in the general SNR regime is
uk(p, wk) = wk ln
(
1 +
gk
wk
)
− pwk. (38)
The optimal demand w∗k(p) that maximizes (38) is
w∗k(p) = gk/H(p), (39)
where H(p) is the unique positive solution to F (p,Q) :=
ln(1 +H) − H1+H − p = 0. The inverse function of H(p) is
p(H) = ln(1 +H)− H1+H . By applying the implicit function
theorem, we can obtain the first derivative of function H(p)
over p as
H ′(p) = −∂F (p,H)/∂p
∂F (p,H)/∂p
=
(1 +H(p))2
H(p)
, (40)
which is always positive. Hence, H(p) is increasing in p.
User k’s optimal payoff is
uk(p, w
∗
k(p)) =
gk
H(p)
[ln(1 +H(p))− p]. (41)
As a result, user k’s optimal SNR equals gk/w∗k(p) = H(p)
and is user-independent.
2) Monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy: The users’ total
preferred demand equals G/H(p), and the operator’s pricing
problem in Stage II is to maximize its revenue R(B, p) =
pmin(B,G/H(p)) by optimally choosing a price. Let us
define S(p) = pB and D(p) = Gp/H(p).
The first derivative of D(p) over p is
D′(p) =
G[2H2(p) +H(p)− (1 +H(p))2 ln(1 +H(p))]
H3(p)
,
which is positive when 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.468 and is negative when
p > 0.468. Notice that D′(p) approaches to positive infinity
when p goes to 0.
The second derivative of D(p) over p can be shown to be
negative when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.266 and positive when p > 1.266.
Thus D(p) is concave in its increasing part with 0 ≤ p ≤
0.468.
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Fig. 14. Different relations between D(p) and S(p) in general SNR regime
Fig. 14 illustrates the all possible relation between D(p)
and S(p) which is a linear function of p. The nonlinear
curve represents the function D(p). The two linear solid lines
represent two representative values of pB. The other linear
dashed line is with threshold slope Bth := 0.462G that
intersects D(p) at its maximum value. Note that S(p) always
intersects D(p) since we have shown that the slope of D(p)
at p = 0 becomes positive infinity. To maximize the revenue,
we will have the following two pricing cases:
• Monopolist’s low investment regime: if B ≤ Bth (e.g.,
BL in Fig. 14), then it is optimal to choose a price such
that the supply equals demand (i.e., B = G/H(p)),
p∗(B) = ln
(
1 +
G
B
)
− G
B +G
. (42)
• Monopolist’s high investment regime: if B > Bth (e.g.,
BH in Fig. 14), then it is optimal to choose a price such
that supply exceeds demand,
p∗(B) = 0.468. (43)
3) Main proof of duopoly symmetric pricing structure: Now
let us consider the two operator case based on the monopolist’s
result. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium (p∗i , p∗j ) with
p∗i 6= p∗j . The operator announcing lower price acts as
a monopolist. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Bi ≤ Bj . In the following analysis, we examine asymmetric
pricing equilibrium in all (Bi, Bj) possibilities.
(a) If Bth < Bi ≤ Bj , then any operator will not announce
their prices higher than 0.468, in a fear of losing all
its realized demand to its competitor. And the operator
with the lower price will always increase its price to
infinitely approach the other operator’s price, and thus
no equilibrium can be obtained.
(b) If Bi ≤ Bth ≤ Bj , then operator i will announce p∗i ≤
0.468 and operator j will announce p∗j ≤ ln(1+G/Bi)−
G/(Bi +G). And the operator with the lower price will
always increase its price to infinitely approach the other
operator’s price, and no equilibrium can be obtained.
(c) If Bi ≤ Bj < Bth, then operator i will announce
p∗i ≤ ln(1 +G/Bj)−G/(Bj +G), and operator j will
announce p∗j ≤ ln(1 + G/Bi) − G/(Bi + G). And the
operator with lower price will always increase its price
to infinitely approach the other operator’s price, and thus
no equilibrium can be obtained.
Thus there only exists possible symmetric pricing equilibrium.
4) Main proof of duopoly pricing equilibrium: Now we
consider the duopoly pricing equilibrium (p∗i , p∗j ) which should
satisfy p∗i = p∗j . Let us write symmetric price as p∗. Since a
user k’s demand is gk/H(p∗) in (39), the users’ total preferred
demand is G/H(p∗). Following a similar analysis in Section
III-A, the realized demands of the two operators are
Qi = min
(
Bi,
G
2H(p∗)
+ max
(
G
2H(p∗)
−Bj , 0
))
,
Qj = min
(
Bj ,
G
2H(p∗)
+ max
(
G
2H(p∗)
−Bi, 0
))
.
Two operators’ revenues are Ri = p∗Qi and Rj = p∗Qj ,
respectively. Assume, without loss of generality, that Bi ≤ Bj .
In the following analysis, we examine all (Bi, Bj) possibilities,
and check if there exists any symmetric pricing equilibrium.
(a) If Bth < Bi ≤ Bj , we have shown that p∗ ≤ 0.468. We
investigate possible pricing equilibrium given operator j’s
investment amount.
– If p∗ ≤ ln(1 + G/Bj) − G/(Bj + G), operator j’s
investment is not enough to satisfy the total preferred
demand.
∗ If Bi ≤ G2H(p∗) , operator i can not realize even
all its preferred demand.
· If total supply is larger than total preferred de-
mand (i.e., Bi+Bj > G/H(p∗)), then operator
j will slightly decrease its price to attract much
more preferred demand.
· If total supply is smaller than total preferred
demand (i.e., Bi +Bj ≤ G/H(p∗)), operator j
will slightly increase its price while its attracted
preferred demand will not change.
∗ If Bi > G2H(p∗) , operator i’s investment is enough
to cover its preferred demand. Then operator j
will slightly decrease its price to attract much
more preferred demand from its competitor.
– If p∗ > ln(1 + G/Bj) − G/(Bj + G), operator j’s
investment amount is enough to satisfy the total pre-
ferred demand. Then operator j will slightly decrease
its price to attract much more preferred demand.
Hence, there does not exist an equilibrium in case (a).
(b) If Bi ≤ Bth ≤ Bj , we have shown that p∗ ≤ 0.468 and
p∗ ≤ ln(1 + G/Bi) − G/(Bi + G). Then we can show
that there does not exist an equilibrium in case (b) by a
similar argument as in case (a).
(c) If Bi ≤ Bj < Bth, we will first show that total supply
equals total preferred demand at any possible equilibrium
(i.e., p∗ = ln(1 +G/(Bi +Bj))−G/(Bi +Bj +G)).
– Suppose that at an equilibrium p∗ < ln(1+G/(Bi+
Bj)) − G/(Bi + Bj + G) and thus total supply is
smaller than total preferred demand. Then operator
j will slightly increase its price while its attracted
preferred demand will not change.
– Suppose that at an equilibrium p∗ > ln(1+G/(Bi+
Bj)) − G/(Bi + Bj + G) and thus total supply is
larger than total preferred demand. Then operator j
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will slightly decrease its price to attract much more
preferred demand.
Thus total supply equals total preferred demand with
p∗ = ln(1 + G/(Bi + Bj)) − G/(Bi + Bj + G) for
possible equilibrium. Let us check if this is indeed an
equilibrium given total investment amount.
– If Bi + Bj > Bth, then we have p∗ < 0.468.
Operator i gets its supply sold out, and essentially it
acts as a monopolist in serving its realized users in
monopolist’s high investment regime. Thus operator
i will increase its price to 0.468.
– If Bi + Bj ≤ Bth, then we have p∗ ≥ 0.468.
Operator i gets its supply sold out, and essentially
acts as a monopolist in serving its realized users in
monopolist’s low investment regime. Thus it’s opti-
mal to stick with current price. Similarly, operator j
will also stick with current price.
Thus there exists a unique pricing equilibrium with p∗i =
p∗j = ln(1 +G/(Bi +Bj))−G/(Bi +Bj +G) for low
investment regime (i.e., Bi +Bj ≤ Bth) only.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
1) Proof of Observation 1: The competition between two
operators in Stage I can be modeled as the following invest-
ment game:
• Players: operators i and j.
• Strategy space: two operators will choose (Bi, Bj) from
the set B = {(Bi, Bj) : Bi +Bj ≤ Bth}.
• Payoff function: two operators want to maximize their
own profits πi(Bi, Bj) in (23) and πj(Bi, Bj) in (24).
The best response of operator i (i.e., B∗i (Bj)) also equals
argmax0≤Bi≤Bth−Bj πi(Bi, Bj)/G. Notice that
πi(Bi, Bj)/G
=
Bi
G
[
ln
(
1 +
1
Bi
G
+
Bj
G
)
− 1
Bi
G
+
Bj
G
+ 1
− Ci
]
,
where Bi always appears together with G. Thus B∗i (Bj) is
linear in G and we can similarly show that B∗j (Bi) is also
linear in G. Since the possible equilibrium (B∗i , B∗j ) is derived
by joint solving equations B∗i = B∗i (B∗j ) and B∗j = B∗j (B∗i ),
B∗i and B∗j are both linear in the users’ aggregate wireless
characteristics G.
2) Proof of Observation 2: It is obvious that the symmetric
pricing equilibrium in (22) is determined by B∗i /G and B∗j /G
only. Since we have shown that operators’ equilibrium invest-
ment decisions are both linearly proportional to G, thus the
pricing equilibrium p∗i (B∗i , B∗j ) = p∗j (B∗i , B∗j ) is independent
of the users’ wireless characteristics.
3) Proof of Observation 4: Assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that a user k purchases bandwidth from operator i. We
have shown in (39) that each user k’s equilibrium demand
is always positive, linear in gk. And it is also decreasing in
symmetric equilibrium price since positive function H(p∗i ) is
increasing in p∗i .
And the SNR of user k is SNRk = H(p∗i ), which also
equals H(p∗j ) at symmetric pricing equilibrium. Thus each
user k ∈ K achieves the same SNR independent of its wireless
characteristic gk. And it is clear that user k’s payoff in (41)
is independent of user k’s wireless characteristic gk.
4) Proof of Observation 5: It is clear that as duopoly’s
symmetric price increases, the users’ achieved SNR increases
but their payoffs decrease in general SNR regime. To prove
Observation 5, we only need to show that as leasing cost Ci
or Cj increases, equilibrium price will also increase. In the
following analysis, we first show that symmetric equilibrium
price increases as Bi or Bj decreases. Then we show that Bi
or Bj decreases as leasing cost Ci or Cj increases.
• It is easy to check that the first derivatives of p∗i (Bi, Bj)
over Bi and Bj are both negative, Thus duopoly’s sym-
metric equilibrium price increases as Bi or Bj decreases.
• Operator i’s revenue is Ri(Bi, Bj) = Bip∗i (Bi, Bj)
with p∗i (Bi, Bj) in (22), and its profit in (23) also
equals πi(Bi, Bj) = Ri(Bi, Bj) − BiCi. Due to the
strict concavity of πi(Bi, Bj) over Bi, operator i will
optimally lease B∗i to make ∂πi(Bi, B∗j )/∂Bi |Bi=B∗i = 0(i.e., ∂Ri(Bi, B∗j )/∂Bi |Bi=B∗i = Ci). And Ri(Bi, B∗j )
is concave in Bi by checking the twice derivative of
Ri(Bi, Bj) over Bi,
∂2Ri(Bi, B
∗
j )
∂B2i
= − G
2
(Bi +B∗j +G)
3(Bi +B∗j )
2
·
[−B2i +GBi +BiB∗j + 2GB∗j + 2B∗2j ],
which is negative due to Bi + Bj ≤ Bth. Thus B∗i
decreases as Ci increases.
Hence, users’ equilibrium SNR increases with the costs Ci
and Cj , and their payoffs decrease with the costs.
G. Proof of Theorem 5
If Bi > 0 and Bj = 0 in the coordinated case, only
operator i will then participate in pricing stage and it becomes
a monopolist. According to [27], the optimal leasing amount
of monopolist is in low supply regime and the optimal price
is to make the users’ total demand equal to its supply. Thus
operator i will announce the unique price
pcoi = ln
(
G
Bi
)
− 1.
Similar result can be obtained for Bi = 0 and Bj > 0.
If min(Bi, Bj) > 0, both the coordinated operators will
participate in the pricing stage. Since the duopoly’s payments
(BiCi and BjCj) are already determined, the two operators
will cooperate to maximize their total revenue only in pricing
stage. Without loss of generality, we assume pcoi ≤ pcoj , and
find the optimal pricing strategies of coordinated duopoly as
follows.
• We first show the feasible range of pcoi and pcoj should be
pcoi ≤ ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1 ≤ pcoj . The reason is as follows.
According to Proposition 1, duopoly will set the prices
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such that total supply equals to the users’ total demand
and it is easy to check that
Bie
1+pcoi +Bje
1+pcoj = G.
Then we conclude that (Bi + Bj)e1+p
co
i ≤ G ≤ (Bi +
Bj)e
1+pcoj , and thus pcoi ≤ ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1 ≤ pcoj .
• Then we derive the relation between pcoi and pcoj . All
the users have priority to purchase bandwidth from op-
erator i who charges less, and operator i’s revenue is
pcoi min(Bi, Ge
−(1+pcoi )). We then discuss different rela-
tion between operator i’s supply and preferred demand.
– If Bi > Ge−(1+p
co
i ), then operator i’s supply is
excessive compared with the preferred demand. Due
to Proposition 1, this will not happen in coordinated
case.
– If Bi ≤ Ge−(1+pcoi ), then operator i’s supply is not
enough to meet the preferred demand and we have
Bi =
∑
k∈KR
i
gke
−(1+pcoi )
. And the left demand go-
ing to operator j will be (G−∑k∈KR
i
gk)e
−(1+pcoj )
.
Since Proposition 1 requires total demand equals
total supply, the operator j should decide a price
such that its supply equals the left demand, i.e.,
pcoj = ln
(
(G−Bie1+pcoi )/Bj
)− 1.
Thus we conclude that pcoj is a function of pcoi and rewrite
it as
pcoj (p
co
i ) = ln
(
G−Bie1+pcoi
Bj
)
− 1.
• In pricing stage, the total profit maximization problem
in coordinated case is equivalent to the total revenue
maximization problem. And the total revenue can be
expressed as a function of pi only. The solution to the
total revenue maximization problem is
pcoi = arg max
0≤pi≤ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
−1
Bipi +Bjp
co
j (p
co
i ).
Since Bipi + Bjpcoj (pcoi ) is an increasing function of pi
on range 0 ≤ pi ≤ ln
(
G
Bi+Bj
)
− 1, we have
pcoi = ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1.
By substituting the value of pcoi into Bie1+p
co
i +
Bje
1+pcoj = G, we also obtain
pcoj = ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1.
Hence, the optimal pricing strategies of coordinated
duopoly are
pcoi = p
co
j = ln
(
G
Bi +Bj
)
− 1.
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